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SITING FOREIGN LAW:
HOW DERRIDA CAN HELP
PIERRE LEGRAND*
“I want to read what is, however, not written.”
— Maurice Blanchot1
Jacques Derrida was born to a Sephardic Jewish family near Algiers in
1930, in what was then French Algeria (at school, says Derrida, there was
“not a word about Algeria, not a single one about its history and its
geography, whereas we could draw the coast of Brittany or the Gironde
estuary with our eyes closed”).2 As a child, Derrida was the victim of harsh
anti-Semitism, which translated into his expulsion from the local French
primary school in 1942 along with all other Jewish students. Five years
later, plagued by adolescent anxieties, he was unsuccessful on his first
attempt at the baccalauréat or high-school leaving assessment. He later
moved to France, where in 1950 he failed the entrance examination at the
prestigious Ecole normale supérieure, France’s training school for teachers,
and did not in fact succeed in being admitted to this institution for a further
two years. His academic difficulties continued, and he subsequently
foundered at the national concours d’agrégation, which would have
accredited him as a philosophy teacher. Only in 1956 did he finally qualify.

* Professor of Law and Director of Postgraduate Studies in Globalization and Legal Pluralism at
the Sorbonne, Paris; Board of Visitors Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of San Diego Law
School; Senior Fellow, University of Melbourne Law School; Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law,
National University of Singapore. I delivered a rendition of this argument at the Center for
Transnational Legal Studies in London on 25 November 2009. I am indebted to Professors Franz Werro
and Carrie Menkel-Meadow who, at the behest of Georgetown University and its partner institutions,
extended a generous invitation. I released an initial redaction of the text in the inaugural edition of the
Romanian Journal of Comparative Law in 2010. I thank Professor Raluca Bercea for soliciting my
participation. I owe Professor Ralf Michaels for suggesting the publication of a revised version of the
essay on the occasion of my 16 February 2011 presentation at Duke Law School, which he hosted along
with the Editors of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law. I was then acting as Visiting
Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. MAURICE BLANCHOT, L’ESPACE LITTERAIRE 257 (Gallimard 1955) (“Je veux lire ce qui n’est
pourtant pas écrit”) (emphasis in original).
2. JACQUES DERRIDA, LE MONOLINGUISME DE L’AUTRE 76 (Galilée 1996) (“pas un mot sur
l’Algérie, pas un seul sur son histoire et sur sa géographie, alors que nous pouvions dessiner les yeux
fermés les côtes de Bretagne ou l’estuaire de la Gironde”).
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Somewhat surprisingly given his checkered academic itinerary, within ten
years or so Derrida had revealed himself as an extraordinarily gifted,
challenging, and prolific philosophical mind. By the end of the 1970s, his
work having been translated in numerous languages and his thought having
found a receptive audience in a whole range of disciplines, Derrida had
become the most influential voice within the crowded field of French
philosophy. In 1998, the New York Times referred to him as “perhaps the
world’s most famous philosopher—if not the only famous philosopher.”3
Two documentary films were subsequently devoted to Derrida, which is
perhaps another mark of his success. Jacques Derrida died in October 2004
having taught in Paris for more than forty years, acted repeatedly as visiting
professor at a substantial number of distinguished U.S. universities, and
given conferences all over the world. In an op-ed piece published in the
New York Times days after his death, it was said that “[a]long with Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida . . . will be
remembered as one of the three most important philosophers of the 20th
century.” The author aptly remarked that “[p]hilosophers, theologians,
literary and art critics, psychologists, historians, writers, artists, legal
scholars and even architects have found in his writings resources for
insights that have led to an extraordinary revival of the arts and humanities
during the past four decades.”4
∞
I did not beseech Derrida. Rather, he came to me through the very
good fortune of a key encounter with a colleague to whom I continue to
feel profoundly indebted. When I began reading De la grammatologie,
Marges, and Positions, I had been teaching law for five years and was
becoming more disappointed by the day as too many colleagues, reducing
their scholarly mandate to that of compliant expositor of the law, promised
more clarity, more stability, more harmony than they could ever deliver.
Unusually, I was a teacher who harbored an interest in foreign law. To be
sure, if one is a Canadian wishing to graduate from Canada, as I fervently
did even before entering law school in Montreal, one has little choice but to
devote oneself to foreign law. Yet, I took the matter one step further and,
influenced by one of my professors, formed the view that foreign law could
hold a significant and indeed crucial measure of normative purchase for
judges and lawyers operating locally. My first paper, which I began writing
3. Dinitia Smith, Philosopher Gamely in Defense of His Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, (May 30, 1998),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/30/arts/philosopher-gamely-in-defense-of-his-ideas.html.
4. Mark C. Taylor, What Derrida Really Meant, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/10/14/opinion/14taylor.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1259848969-ukn969
Q8ncl7q+zvHCwn9g.
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after my initial year of law school, thus made the case for the transposition
of a French precept to the law of obligations in Quebec through what I
would now regard as some kind of Heideggerian leap. Given the way in
which I was fashioning my scholarly life-in-the-law, I was rapidly—and
willingly—instituted in an academic field known (problematically) as
“comparative law.” This meant that when the time came to engage in
postgraduate work, I found myself gravitating towards the Chair of
Comparative Law at Oxford. This happened before “comparative law” had
become cosmopolitan chic in Princeton and also before everyone would
aspire to be a comparativist for fifteen lines. These were the days, in fact,
when the Chair of Comparative Law at Oxford was still identified by his
peers as an academic leader rather than as someone’s disciple.
“Comparative law,” which, with hindsight, recognizably emerged in
the 1820s, features, like other academic fields, its own learned societies,
journals, conferences, chairs, research institutes, courses, and even its
postgraduate programs. Of course, labels are in flux and words like
“transnational” eventually made an appearance on the intellectual scene
suggesting, perhaps, an alternative slant. Beyond fashionable designations,
though, the pertinent research and teaching enterprises remain infused by
one abiding concern, which is a determination to extol the value of the
foreign in terms of what is relevantly legal locally. As is no doubt the case
with every other field, “comparative law” boasts an orthodoxy. I have in
mind established comparativists, those who edit the journals, are called
upon by leading academic publishers to assess book proposals, secure large
budgets to launch major research projects or fund new postgraduate
programs, and direct centers or institutes. These comparativists function in
a structuring capacity in that they uphold an identifiable regime of
knowledge and information. On account of the institutional positions they
hold, they defend what they regard as good comparative practice, that is,
good comparative manners—or, which is another way of making the point,
they promote themselves as good comparativists-at-law. Wanting to
preserve the capital of authority they have acquired over the years, wishing
to protect the credit they have built for themselves, and desiring in effect
for time to stand still, orthodox comparativists are prone to exclude
dissenters, those whose work is seen by them to be wavering and,
paradoxically, to be competing with theirs for the assumption of
institutional dominance, those whose comparation would accelerate the
passage of time so that there occurs at last a displacement of the locus of
institutional exemplarity. As Derrida underlines, what is deemed to be
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“good writing has . . . always been comprised,” that is, “enveloped.”5
Allowing closure occasionally to recede just long enough to permit a nod to
inclusivism, parts of the seventh edition of a leading U.S. casebook devoted
to “comparative law” offer one illustration of how far the dogmatic
architectonics within the field―nothing short of a fully-fledged process of
censorship―can be taken.
While I would not deny that every comparativist speaks in a voice
which retains a measure of idiosyncrasy, despite being overdetermined
institutionally and otherwise, I argue that orthodox comparativists largely
share an approach to the law that can legitimately be designated as
“positivism” or “legal positivism.” In brief, this technology of analytical
knowledge can stand for the proposition that what counts as law is what is
binding as law and that the interpreter’s task is to describe “that” without
distortion. It follows that what should be made into an object of study as far
as orthodox comparativists are concerned is precisely what is binding as
law and that comparativism ought to attest to binding law through strictly
conceptual, logical, and systematic expositions articulated neutrally,
objectively, and “scientifically” with a view to strict exactitude.
Traditionally, positivism’s focus on bindingness had meant that “law” was
to be strictly equated with the law in force within a given jurisdiction. One
of the major emancipatory achievements of “comparative law” since its
institutional inception has been to widen the range of positivism, to include
foreign positivisms within the legitimate province of “law” as an object of
study, mostly manifesting themselves at the national level. This has been
accomplished despite the obvious fact that foreign law is in principle
devoid of any binding character beyond its own jurisdictional confines.
But such deterritorialization has remained limited to a strictly
geographical motion. In particular, it has failed to extend to a
deterritorialization of the mind that would have taken “comparative law”
beyond technical ingenuity and mathematical subtlety and would have led
comparativists to develop an understanding of law adequate to the task of
cross-border investigations. Instead, comparativists, unable to escape the
“system” into which they were institutionalized, have simply projected
onto the international scene the positivism that they were used to practicing
within their “own” law (as if law belonged . . .). In other words, while
orthodox comparativists are indeed occupying the pan-national stage, they
remain unrepentant positivists committed as ever to a conception of the law

5. JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE 30 (Editions de Minuit 1967) (“[l]a bonne
écriture a . . . toujours été comprise”/“envelopp[é]e”) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter DERRIDA,
GRAMMATOLOGIE].
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as binding law and determined as always to limit their work to “that,” to the
law that is binding. To this day, then, published comparative research
continues to be squarely focused on statutes and reported appellate
decisions―on what has been posited by relevant officials as “the law.” A
prominent U.S. comparativist, in my view very much expressing himself as
pars pro toto, thus felt able to write as follows in 2007: “I am concerned
with what the law [i]s.” I claim that this statement exemplifies the
governing view within the field of “comparative law,” which accordingly
operates as a form of market-led, breathless technical/practical service
rather than as cogitative scholarship, hence the disenchantment I expressed
above. What we get is not rigor, but rigor mortis.
But what is wrong with addressing statutes and judicial decisions?
Why is legal positivism problematic for comparative legal studies? In a
nutshell, my argument is that it is impossible simply to transfer beyond
borders an approach to the legal which prevails locally because
primordially different considerations obtain in those two situations. At the
local level, the creation of a harmonious legal environment in the name of
values such as predictability and certainty may well call, in the end, for the
elimination of discordance. Consider how a judge strives to ensure that her
decision does not contradict legislation and how she attempts to reconcile it
with opinions already written by other judges. And observe how the author
of a textbook likewise purports to syncretize all judicial decisions on a
given topic, to ensure that somehow they all fit together and that they do
not contradict one another. Throughout, the dominant values are very much
those of predictability and certainty. The last thing that French or German
lawyers operating in France or Germany want is the kind of cacophony that
would make it difficult to ascertain what the law in force states on any
given point at any given time.6
Is the situation not precisely the same on the transnational scene? For
legal agents engaging in legal analysis that involves more than one law, it
is arguable that predictability and certainty matter as much in that context
as they do locally. Thus, I do not wish to dispute the affinity that can be
claimed between the two sets of circumstances in this regard. But it is the
6. This argument is usefully developed by Rodolfo Sacco, who writes that “[o]ne tends to see,
within a legal order, the will of the legislator, who creates the norm, and scholarship and judicial
decisions that interpret and apply this will. In principle, the various rules (legal, scholarly, or judicial)
should be identical. If there is a difference, it must be ascribed to an error on the part of the interpreter.”
RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 47 (UTET, 5th ed. 1992) (“si tende a
vedere, all’interno di un ordinamento, una volontà del legislatore, che crea la norma, e una dottrina ed
una giurisprudenza che interpretano e applicano questa volontà. Le varie regole (legale, dottrinale,
giudiziaria) sarebbero, in via di principio, identiche. Se una difformità esiste, ciò si deve imputare ad
un errore dell’interprete”).
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case that irrespective of the relevance of predictability and certainty in
cross-border settings, these values have to contend with a competing set of
ideas that are specific to dynamics involving the foreign. I have in mind the
premises that always already need to inform any relationship between self
and other, specifically between self-in-the-law and other-in-the-law,
between the self’s law and the other’s law. For me, these primordial
notions go under the names of “recognition” and “respect” (which need not
entail complaisance to fundamentalist regimes or agreement with rain
dances). They attest to the fact that the other is not just another self, that he
cannot be reduced to an alter ego. In the process, they incline the self to
resist hegemonic or totalitarian thinking (which is not to be apprehended as
a strictly Nazi or Stalinist phenomenon) and to avoid positioning himself as
that by reference to which the other ought to be assessed. While univocality
may be desirable locally, the exigencies set by the co-presence of the
foreign in cross-national situations firmly demand equivocality.
My basic contention, then, is that the foreign makes especial claims on
one. For the Anglophone reader, the poetry of Char in French or of Celan
in German creates an interpretive situation which challenges him in a
manner that differs from, say, the way in which does Blake’s poetry.
Within cross-national dynamics, in a situation where one is dealing with a
law that is not one’s “own,” with a law that is, in effect, someone else’s,
certain protocols imperatively need to be implemented in order to avoid the
surfeit of ethnocentricity that is liable to discredit the comparative analysis.
One could say that the matter concerns the formulation of an ethics
responding edifyingly to the specific type of summons conjured by the copresence of the other. Surprisingly, I should think, one observes that this
attitude represents but a minoritarian stance within comparative legal
studies. Thus, in 1995, a leading U.S. comparativist, someone whom I
situate firmly within the comparative orthodoxy, felt able to write, “[t]here
[is] nothing distinctively German, French or American about [German,
French, or American judicial] decisions.” For his part, an influential
German comparativist who, in the published English translation of his
work, declares the “immaterial[ity] of differences across laws” and
proclaims a “unitary sense of justice,” offers a further illustration of the
established perspective. While these opinions faithfully exemplify the
orthodoxy within the field of “comparative law,” they fail―rather
abysmally―to do justice to the singularity of the laws that are other than
one’s “own.” What we have instead is a not-so-discreet ethnocentric
projection allowing one to say that the various laws under scrutiny, not
being different from one another in ways that matter, are in effect like
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one’s “own,” which entails, most conveniently, that one need not call one’s
law (or oneself) into question.
But the demonstrably empirical fact is that if there is more than one
law, there is difference across laws. It is not a matter of whether difference
is there or not, for it exists. It is about what the comparativist will make of
the difference that exists. Will he try to efface it on account of its
inconvenience to his research program? Will he try to ignore it? Along
these lines, a well-known comparativist-at-law wrote in 1995 that
comparativists ought to engage in the “manipulation” of data in order to
make laws look similar. Or will the comparativist, in the name of
recognition and respect for the other’s law, try to do justice to differenceat-law through an examination of the matrices within which laws are
ensconsed? Will a comparativist accept, for example, that if the French
legislature will not allow the wearing of conspicuous religious dress at
school, there are historical, political, social, demographic, and
epistemological reasons for this decision, which deserve to be elucidated as
law if one is to get a meaningful understanding of the relevant French
statute? And will the comparativist acknowledge that if the Supreme Court
of Canada will allow a twelve year-old Sikh to wear his ceremonial metal
dagger (or “kirpan”) at school, there are, also, historical, political, social,
demographic, and epistemological reasons for this determination, which
deserve to be elucidated as law if one is to get a meaningful understanding
of the Canadian decision? For those who prefer corporate law with their
dinner, I can offer an analogous argument with respect to the rights of
minority shareholders. In the United States and in the United Kingdom, the
crucial determinant of the legality of management action has been
“shareholder interest.” To decide what management can do to combat a
take-over attempt, for instance, judges ask themselves whether the best
interests of shareholders are being served. In France, the criterion is
different. French judges examine not shareholder interest but the interest of
the company as a whole, what is known as “intérêt social” (or “social
interest”). This distinction is not insignificant. One can easily imagine, for
instance, management attempting to foil a take-over bid in the interest of
the company as a whole (which they happen to be managing) while the bid
would benefit individual shareholders.7 My claim is that, just as with
religious dress at school, what we have here is more than one model of
corporate governance, each being informed by historical, political, social,
philosophical, and epistemological considerations, which require to be

7. See Ben Clift, French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of
Change and Hybridisation Within Models of Capitalism, 55 POL. STUD. 546 (2007).
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elucidated as law if one is to get a meaningful understanding of, say, the
U.S. or French law of corporate governance.
Does positivism or legal positivism assist the comparativist in
capturing this constitutive dimension of the law, which, incidentally, will
be found to prove singular to each law? Positivism is inherently about
determining what law is and what is law. It is concerned with
circumscribing what counts as “law.” This is what, structurally, positivism
would be in a position to accomplish. As regards foreign law, then,
positivism can allow one only to identify the law in force. It cannot do more
than that and cannot reasonably be expected or made to do more than that.
When it comes to foreign law, positivism is thus seen to behave in
stubbornly static and documentary fashion. How can a comparativist who
is operating across borders and addressing a law that is not his “own,” a
law which is an other’s law and another law, a law which requires to be
understood, which calls for ascription of meaning, how can such a
comparativist, then, be content with a mere process of identification?
Imagine that I am teaching U.S. students in California, and that I am
trying to get them to make sense of the French statute on religious dress at
school, which they initially regard as excessive, intolerant, and contrary to
what they envisage as freedom of religion. How do I help the case for
understanding if I engage in a positivistic re-presentation of the French
statute? What good is it for me to rehearse how the French courts have
interpreted the word “schools” or what meaning, broad or narrow, textbook
writers have assigned to the expression “religious signs”? Will I get my
U.S. students to deepen their understanding of the French statute to the
point where, although they are likely to continue to disagree with it on
account of their situation within a multicultural society, they can at least get
to appreciate it? The answer, it seems to me, is negative: positivism will
simply not allow me to generate such sensitivity for the foreign.
Of course, to ascertain what counts as “law” can be regarded as a
necessary first step, which the comparativist would be hard-pressed to
avoid.8 It is law that we lawyers have made our concern, and as one moves
into foreign legal territory one evidently needs to determine where “law” is
to be found to exist and what it says. Yet, precisely because one is dealing
with the foreign, it would be unacceptably reductionist to confine one’s

8. But see Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal
Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 13 n. 37 (1997): “I do not wish to enter into the largely sterile and
boring discussion of what can be considered law.” While it is hard to comprehend why a comparativistat-law would openly want to identify himself with such philistinism under any set of circumstances, the
inclusion of this statement in an essay devoted to the classification of laws makes matters especially
difficult even for the benevolent reader.
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encounter with the “legal” to a process of formal identification. As an
account of foreign law, mere identification of what that law is, of what it
says, will not do. A more complex form of understanding is needed. And
this claim cannot be reduced to an esoteric argument concerning the
academic practice of “comparative law.” It raises, rather, a crucial political
issue. To summarize, positivism is predicated upon an anterior practical
view of the world and of the law. Given the way in which it strategically
seeks to work itself pure under cover of science, such that certain
information is mechanistically excluded from the sphere of relevance and
some questions made never to arise, it is obvious that positivism harbors a
specific disposition, that it assumes a (political) position no matter how
much it strives to disclaim any interest in law’s political governance (any
positing is someone’s positing, which means that not even exegesis can be
presuppositionless). My dissatisfaction with “comparative law”’s
smothering artifices stems from the fact that I find its sclerotic political
position intellectually indefensible and ethically untenable. I argue, then,
that “comparative law” requires a different politics. I have, in fact, been
making this case for more than fifteen years safe in the knowledge that the
battle for an alternative “comparative law” would confine me, as a nomadic
theorist and a theoretical nomad, to a marginal itinerancy at the periphery
of the field. As was to be expected, orthodox comparativists have been
content to discredit my work or ignore it.9 To be sure, I could simply have
left the field and, rather than obstinately inscribe my protest when offered
the opportunity to do so, have made my intellectual life elsewhere (which I
want to continue thinking I may yet do). As I have been pursuing my
challenge to the orthodoxy in favor of a different economy of knowledge
better suited to the polyvocality and equivocality characteristic of the crossborder legal scene, I have found Derrida to be supplying a unique brand of
intellectual assistance, at once discerning and indefectible. To those who, in
response to this statement, are preparing to abridge their reading of this
paper on the assumption that Derrida, qua philosopher, cannot have
anything worthwhile to contribute to “comparative law,” I retort that such
inference is about as informed as that of a traductologist who would deny

9. I am referring strictly to “orthodox comparativists.” At times, their omissions have proved
caricatural enough to attract scholarly attention thus confirming the fact that being ignored can lead to
an alternative form of existence. See, e.g., Peter Goodrich, Intellection and Indiscipline, 36 J.L. SOC’Y
460, 474 (2009). See also Mathias M. Siems, Book Review, 12 EDINBURGH L. REV. 334, 335 (2008)
(reviewing ESIN ÖRÜCÜ & DAVID NELKEN, COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (2007)). Having noted
Siems’s text for present purposes, I would not want to be taken to endorse its crude statistical
apprehension of the matter of relevance, which I find simplistic and, well, vulgar.
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Luther’s relevance because he was a theologian or of an anthropologist
who would object to Saussure’s pertinence since he was a linguist.
Admittedly, law was not Derrida’s principal interest; however, he
worked tirelessly on texts and on interpretation. And since law, including
foreign law, can reasonably be said largely to consist of texts (even on a
narrow definition of the word “text”)―for example, the text of the statute,
of the judicial decision, of the treatise, or of the law-review article―and
because what we do as comparativists as we interact with foreign law is in
substantial part to interpret texts, Derrida’s work on texts, more than forty
years of it, deserves our attention. I unhesitatingly accept that other
contemporary thinkers have also made major contributions to our
understanding of texts. I have in mind, for instance, such key intellectuals
as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricœur, and Stanley Fish. But Derrida, in
addition to his work on texts and interpretation, conducted in parallel a
further reflection, extending over all of these forty years also, on the
relationship between self and other, on ethnocentricity and otherness (of
course, anyone at all familiar with the cultural claustrophobia within which
French academia remains mired can easily see how, as a North-African Jew
living in Paris, he would have felt personally concerned). Indeed, in the
very first sentence of one of his first three major books, all published in
1967, Derrida explicitly foregrounded ethnocentrism.
In order to appreciate the merit of Derrida’s contribution to a more
sophisticated understanding of texts against the background of the
relationship between self and other, I hasten to add that there is no need to
turn oneself into some ventriloquizing disciple of his. Personally, I regard
myself as a reader of Derrida, which means, for one thing, that I feel
entitled to behave rather as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos does
vis-à-vis Niklas Luhmann: I can close a book of Derrida’s after having read
two chapters only (and not necessarily consecutive ones at that), go for a
walk in the Jardin du Luxembourg, and upon returning to my study open a
different book, possibly written by some other intellectual.10 My point is
that one can easily take the view that Derrida’s insights in interpretive
matters and as regards the self/other dynamics are worthy of serious
consideration, and may deserve to be received as theoretical investigations
warranting translation into a textual praxis, without embracing the French
philosopher’s world-view in all its ramifications. In any event, Derrida’s
philosophy was never meant to be systematic, that is, it was never intended

10. For the thoughtful expression of his connection with Luhmann, on which I draw, see
ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, NIKLAS LUHMANN: LAW, JUSTICE, SOCIETY 1-2 (2009).
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to form a finished system in which each term would be precisely defined
and situated.
As I try to account for Derrida’s engagement with texts and with
otherness, to assist progress through Derridean foothills and mountains,
especially as steep escarpments present themselves, I propose to organize
my thoughts around eight key clusters of ideas. Inevitably, I base my
account on Derrida’s philosophy as I read it. Although I would not perform
anything that I do not perceive as being already there, in Derrida’s work,
waiting to be brought forth, while I would not consciously embellish or
deface Derrida’s text, I proffer my Derrida―not unlike the way in which a
violonist who plays Paganini’s “Caprices” remains at once compliant with
the score and yet injects interpretive idiomaticity in the course of her
performance.11 After all, reading, even silent reading, like playing the
violin, is an activity and an intervention―it is something that one
does―and it therefore begets an account which cannot be merely
constative. It is, then, to my experience of Derrida that I now turn.
On the Surface
As he approaches the text, Derrida’s first interpretive motion looks
anything but revolutionary. Indeed, he suggests a reproductive reading
along the lines of a “duplicating commentary.”12 He thus notes “the
necessity of first ascertaining a surface or manifest meaning . . . : the
necessity of gaining a good understanding, in a quasi-scholastic way,
philologically and grammatically, by taking into account the dominant and
stable conventions” of authorship which manifest themselves “on the . . .
surface of [the] text.”13 But for Derrida, ascription of meaning cannot stop
at this conventional stage; rather, it must involve a “double gesture.”14 His
second operation boldly wants to be productive and critical. It is not that
the “declared intention is . . . annulled . . . but rather [that it is] inscribed
within a system which it no longer dominates.”15 At this juncture, Derrida,

11. I deliberately inscribe a reference, albeit distant, to NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART
(1976).
12. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 227 (“commentaire redoublant”).
13. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE WORK OF MOURNING 84 (Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas
eds., Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas transl. 2001) (1991). It must not be thought that, as regards
the first step in his strategy of interpretation, Derrida simply assumes basic semantic determinacy.
Indeed, he observes that “[i]ntention is at once differing and deferred”: JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED
INC. 111 (Galilée 1990) (“L’intention est a priori (aussi sec) différante”) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter DERRIDA, LIMITED]. See infra on Derrida’s idea of “differance” (“différance”).
14. DERRIDA, LIMITED, supra note 13, at 50 (“double geste”).
15. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 345 (“[l]’intention déclarée n’est pas annulée
mais inscrite dans un système qu’elle ne domine plus”) (emphasis in original).
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controversially, takes the view that “the self-identity [of the text] is always
withdrawing and displacing itself.”16 I devote the remainder of this essay to
an explication of this other dimension of interpretation, which, as
understood by Derrida, achieves at once the destabilization and
dissemination of meaning.
About Presence
Somewhat unthinkingly, the identity of a text is predicated upon a
conception of presence as visibility. Derrida challenges our habitual
understanding that the presence of the text―what is present as text―can be
reduced in this fashion to the text’s graphical dimension. In the process, he
calls for a different politics of memory and suggests that the text be
envisaged otherwise and, in my words, other-wise―that is, in a manner
that would be more conducive to the endless negotiation with the other that
it necessarily affirms, if discreetly. Simply put, the notion of “presence” is
more complicated than what we have been assuming. What is visible is, of
course, present. Thus, the words on the page are evidently an important part
of the presence of the text. But graphematic substance is not all there is to
the presence of a text. The text, if you will, does not coincide with its
graphic surface. Specifically, something can be present as text―and indeed
be a fully-fledged, constitutive, part of the text―even though not
graphically visible. By way of analogy, consider Véronique at the café.
When we were dating, we used to go to L’Ecritoire often. This was a long
time ago. Yet, when I find myself in that café, I can still see her there,
sitting at our favorite table. I am not talking of the kind of presence that
readily comes to mind when we mention presence, that is, I am not
referring to physical presence. But I am certainly not adverting to absence
either. Although invisibly so, Véronique is present in the room. She haunts
the café. Texts, too, are haunted. In the same manner as the café is not the
(physical) room, as it is not in effect confined to that room (it includes
Véronique, who is not physically at the café), “the text is not the book”―it
is not limited to the book: it “comprises and does not therefore exclude the
world,” it embraces “the other.”17
Of Spectrality and the Trace
Derrida’s claim is that a text consists of its visible dimension―this
would be the graphical part of it―and that it is also made of an invisible

16. Id. at 72 (“l’identité à soi du [texte] se dérobe et se déplace sans cesse”).
17. DERRIDA, LIMITED, supra note 13, at 253 (“le texte n’est pas le livre”/ “comprend et n’exclut
donc pas le monde”/“l’autre”).
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aspect. This constitutive, imperceptible element, he calls the “trace” in the
sense of sign/clue―a notion which he derives from Emmanuel Levinas.18
Derrida’s argument is that a text is but “a fabric of traces.”19 In addition to
its graphical features, a text, being irreducibly relational, or being always
already inscribed in the world (no one can even imagine a text existing “in
the air”), is constituted of a unique if intricate assemblage of an infinite
number of unique traces. To be sure, these heterogeneous traces
assembled―this singular plural―do not leap to the interpreter’s eye, but
they are there: they do haunt the text. Derrida thus urges us to accept that
there is a “spectral” dimension to texts. He wants us to think of traces as
ghosts (the ghost is present, although invisible). These traces are the
precipitate or the deposit left, for example, by history, politics, or
philosophy. They are what history, politics, or philosophy survives as; they
are history, politics, or philosophy’s remains―Derrida refers to ashes or
cinders.20 In this sense, the traces indicate the presence of other discourses
of which they are the vestiges, which they retain (a trace is “retentional”),21
which they iterate (“iteration” is an important Derridean motif, designating
repetition-with-a-difference: the trace is not the same thing as that of which
it is the remainder), whose staying power they manifest, even as they show
themselves to be unstable and transient rather than monumental and
permanent. Somewhat mystically perhaps, Derrida associates the
identification or naming of the remains, of the traces, to a work of
mourning: the thought of the trace involves acceptance of death at work
within life.22 In his words, “[d]eath strolls between the letters.”23
By way of application of Derrida’s argument, consider the French
statute on religious dress at school. It is, of course, constituted of the words
that we see on the page―such is its graphical presence―but it is also made
of the traces that have been left by history, politics, or philosophy.
18. For an acknowledgment of his indebtedness, see DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at
102-03.
19. JACQUES DERRIDA, PARAGES 118 (2d ed., Galilée 2003) (1979) (“un tissu de traces”). This
text first appeared in English as Jacques Derrida, Living On, in HAROLD BLOOM ET AL.,
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 62-142 (James Hulbert transl. 2004) (1979).
20. According to Derrida, “the best paradigm for the trace . . . is not . . . the trail of the hunt, the
fraying, the furrow in the sand, the wake in the sea, the love of the step for its imprint, but the cinder.”
JACQUES DERRIDA, FEU LA CENDRE 27 (Editions des Femmes 1987) (“le meilleur paradigme de la
trace, . . . ce n’est pas . . . la piste de chasse, le frayage, le sillon dans le sable, le sillage dans la mer,
l’amour du pas pour son empreinte, mais la cendre”).
21. JACQUES DERRIDA, LA VOIX ET LE PHENOMENE 95 (Presses Universitaires de France 1967)
(“rétentionnelle”) [hereinafter DERRIDA, VOIX].
22. One of Derrida’s books bears that title. See supra note 13.
23. JACQUES DERRIDA, L’ECRITURE ET LA DIFFERENCE 108 (Le Seuil 1967) (“La mort se
promène entre les lettres”) [hereinafter DERRIDA, ECRITURE].
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Specifically, it is haunted by the history of the relationship between
churches and state as it has developed in France since the early fourteenth
century; by nineteenth-century French colonial politics in North Africa; by
a contemporary conception of “Republican citizenship” prohibiting the idea
of minority rights; and by an epistemological distinction between the
“public” and the “private” harking back to Roman law. In other words, “[a]
text . . . is simultaneously the condensation of a scarcely delimitable
history . . ., of the encyclopedia”; in it “can be gathered the greatest
potentiality of historical, theoretical, linguistic, philosophical culture.”24 It
bears emphasizing that the traces, in all their polyvocality and equivocality,
are constitutive of the text and that they cannot therefore be withdrawn
from the text and find themselves relegated to the text’s context or
parergon, somewhere on the wrong side of the disciplinary palisades. The
statute exists as the history of the relationship between churches and state,
as colonial politics in North Africa, and so forth. Strictly speaking,
therefore, and in Derrida’s own famous words, “[i]l n’y a pas de horstexte,” which is to say, for one thing, that there is nothing which,
dogmatically, can be pronounced to lie in a beyond of the text.25
Accordingly, any act of closure (recall legal positivism’s strategy) is
inadequate in the sense that it necessarily excludes something yet to be
thought through in its textual relevance. Ultimately, the claim regarding
traces is structural in the sense that the traces inhere to the text; they pertain
to the very making of it. Try as he may, a positivist cannot get this structure
to disappear. He may opt to ignore it,26 but he cannot eliminate it. Indeed,
to ignore the trace is to close one’s eyes to what is always already there.
For Derrida, then, there is a law of spectrality at work―“the spectral
structure is the law here”27―which means that what legal positivism would
frame as radical exteriority vis-à-vis the text or as absence from the text,
such as history, politics, or philosophy, is shown not to be exterior to it or
absent from it after all (Véronique is not not-at-the-café). Because the
textual matrix exists as a reticulation of traces (Derrida talks of “the
adventure of the text as weed”),28 each trace being different from all others,
it thus exists as a differential matrix: “Textuality [is] constituted by
24. JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE 43 (Derek Attridge ed. 1992).
25. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 227 (“There is no out-of-text”). This passage
appears in italics in the French original.
26. Cf. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE 6 (2006): “It is no mystery that law is part of
culture, but it is not uncommon for those who, by profession or context, are deeply involved in a given
legal system to act as if ‘The Law’ is quite separable from other elements of cultural life.”
27. JACQUES DERRIDA, PAPIER MACHINE 307 (Galilée 2001) (“la structure spectrale fait ici la
loi”).
28. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 102 (“l'aventure du texte comme mauvaise herbe”).
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differences and by differences from differences.”29 And the text therefore
operates to fasten or bind or band the traces as they come together to
constitute it (as, say, traces of history enmeshed with traces of politics or of
philosophy become a statute).30 The mark of a process of condensation or
agglutination, the text takes the form of a gathering.
To return specifically to law-texts, the motifs of “spectrality” and
“trace” eschew the unduly crude binary distinction between law and nonlaw (the kind of dualism which Derrida, throughout his decades of writing,
consistently derided as “metaphysical”). They reveal that law does not exist
in isolation from other discourses but is affected by them as regards its very
constitution: it is constructed, made, fabricated, assembled, actively
constituted of them. In sum, spectrality marks “the relation of the intimacy
of the living present to its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general,
upon the non-self.”31 It should be clear that we have here a very different,
much more capacious, interpretation of what it must mean to interpret a
law-text.32 There is one additional point. Since they are invisible, the traces
await their unfolding or elucidation or unconcealment―their bringing
forth―by the text’s interpreter who, as he undertakes this archival work, is
required to engage in an anamnesis, indeed in a hypermnesis (a recollection
or recollective thinking, as opposed to an amnesia or forgetting), thus
deploying a sensibility that is in crucial ways more akin to that of the
archeologist’s than the mathematician’s. Only by staging the traces—a
gesture featuring a transacted, kinetic, and performative dimension even as
it purports to abide by the text—can the interpreter (say, the comparativist)
affirm the life of the law-text by giving the traces their due, by doing
justice to the traces, which, as survivancies, have come to constitute the
text. (Note, however, that even the “bringing forth” of traces will fail to
generate the text’s full presence.)

29. JACQUES DERRIDA, LA DISSEMINATION 111 (Le Seuil 1972) (“la textualité étant constituée de
différences et de différences de différences”).
30. In French, Derrida repeatedly uses the verb “bander” as in “le texte bande.” Now, “bander” in
familiar French is to have an erection. Derrida’s pun is that as the text proceeds to band the traces, it
allows itself to stand, erect, as text. See JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS 151b (Galilée 1974): “I suggest that
we try everywhere to replace the verb to be by the verb to band”) (“je propose qu’on essaie partout de
remplacer le verbe être par le verbe bander”) (emphasis in original).
31. DERRIDA, VOIX, supra note 21, at 96 (“le rapport de l’intimité du présent vivant à son dehors,
l’ouverture à l’extériorité en général, au non-propre”). See also JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITIQUE ET
AMITIE 107 (Michael Sprinker ed., Galilée 2011) (1993).
32. In DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 427, Derrida expressly refers to “two interpretations
of interpretation” (“deux interprétations de l’interprétation”).
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On Unconcealment
Etymologically, the word “text,” in addition to evoking authority (the
Scriptures, especially the Gospels, are known as the “Holy Text” or,
simply, the “Text”), connotes the idea of weaving and, more extensively, of
interlacement. In Rome, a “textor” was indeed a weaver and “texere” was
“to weave” (consider the word “textile”). Now, this intermingling of traces
(or threads) whereby texts are woven or fabricated is something that
happens irrespective of the interpreter of the text and yet requires the
interpreter of the text in order to happen. Looking at the matter from the
interpreter’s standpoint, he can be seen to act as an inventor, which,
literally, means that he is simultaneously a finder (someone discovering the
traces which are there as the text) and a creator (someone elucidating the
traces that are there as the text, bringing them to light, fashioning them).
Consider, again, the French statute on religious dress at school. This statute
is haunted by traces of French colonial politics and Roman law. These
traces are there as the statute; in inevitable ways, they are the statute. And
they are the statute irrespective of any comparativist coming along to
ascribe meaning to the statute (“[t]he trace is not an attribute”).33 In other
words, the statute exists as a text featuring traces of French colonialism and
of Romanitas whether or not there is a comparativist around. Yet, without
the comparativist, these traces, which are “necessarily occulted,”34 are
doomed to a kind of mutism. They signify, but they do so in silence. In this
sense, they are destined to remain without effective meaning, that is,
effectively meaning-less. Again, the idea of “invention” accounts for the
fact that the comparativist will have at once found and made foreign law,
that he will have simultaneously identified and configured it.
It is the comparativist-at-law who, by going underground in order to
explore the text’s rhizomes, awakens meaning, brings the traces into
interpretive existence, makes the traces actively mean, attributes dynamic
meaning to them, acts as an enabler of resonant meaning, makes the traces
meaning-ful. As he engages in this act of elevation to fully-fledged
meaning, the comparativist is, strictly speaking, involved in a process of
iteration, which takes us back to my earlier point about “invention.” While
the comparativist reproduces what there is out of fidelity to the
text―Derrida insists that “the reading . . . cannot legitimately transgress

33. DERRIDA, VOIX, supra note 21, at 95 (“La trace n’est pas un attribut”).
34. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 69 (“nécessairement occulté[es]”).
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the text towards something other than itself”35―he inevitably proceeds in
his own (situated) key. Along the way, he brings to bear his own familiarity
with the law that he has made into his object of study, which will indeed
act as an index of his rhetorical ability to persuade his interlocutors or his
readership of the merit of his elucidation. For instance, a comparativist will
fail to realize the presence of traces of French colonial politics haunting the
French statute on religious dress at school unless he is in a position to apply
a sound knowledge of French history, French politics, French philosophy,
French society, French international affairs, in sum, of French culture―an
undertaking which need not fall prey to the trappings of essentialism. There
follows an important implication, no doubt profoundly disturbing for legal
positivism’s allegedly secure but spectacularly self-aggrandizing
conceptual assumptions, which is that, strictly speaking, foreign law is not
simply discovered: it is also achieved. And this fashioning produces a legal
knowledge that can only be situated in relation to a certain epistemological
framework embedded in place and time―interpretation proceeds from
prejudice, from a pre-understanding which, even as it makes emergence of
knowledge possible, also acts to constrain what can manifest itself as
knowledge. In other words, it is impossible for a comparativist to work
referentially only, that is, to operate exclusively by making reference to
something that would be there, without injecting any added value of his
own. Foreign law, therefore, bears the comparativist’s “singular signature”
and appears as nothing short of an “autobiographical inscription.”36
Discreetly perhaps, in silence even, writing in white ink, so to speak, no
matter how seemingly self-effacing or external to the matter, the
comparativist is actively at work―inescapably so―within the formation of
foreign law and is continuously bringing his pre-understanding into play in
order to structure it. Not only is he producing foreign law but he is
producing himself. It follows that there are potentially as many French
statutes on religious dress at school as there will be comparativists coming
to the matter of interpretation of the relevant law-text. Yes, yes. Now, the
fact is, which Derrida never tired of emphasizing, that the moment one
articulates anything about something, one does violence to it. No matter
how purportedly loyal my detailed account of my conversation with
Imogene, I will distort our exchange and, in this way, do violence to it (of

35. Id. at 227 (“[La lecture] ne peut légitimement transgresser le texte vers autre chose que lui”).
See also Jacques Derrida, Countersignature, 27/2 PARAGRAPH 7, 28-29 (2004) (Mairéad Hanrahan
transl. 2000).
36. DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE, supra note 24, at 43. This point is excellently argued in
Raluca Bercea, Toute comparaison des droits est une fiction, in COMPARER LES DROITS, RESOLUMENT
41-68 (Pierre Legrand ed., Presses Universitaires de France 2009).
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course, my violent narrativization is also a means whereby I can account
for my interlocutor’s utterances). While this tension can be attenuated and a
lesser violence exerted, it is beyond resolution. Such is the alternative
economy of meaning: not only does the comparativist-at-law save meaning
(by taking what is there), but he also dispenses it (by fabricating what there
is). In the final analysis, this economy is an economy of war, which no
interpreter can avoid.37 The appeasement that would come with “saving”
nullifying any role for “dispensing” or with “dispensing” occupying the
scene completely, thus leaving no room whatsoever for “saving,” is beyond
reach. One implication following upon these observations is that posited
law will not be overcome. Indeed, it should not be.
Of Obliquation
The traces can be regarded as a supplement to the text understood in
its graphical dimension, as that which “replaces a lack.”38 Consider the
taking of a dietary supplement, such as vitamins, which the body may
require in order to operate optimally as body. My basic goal, then, is to
redeem the repressed, that is, to put what has been relegated to the exterior
of law-texts back within the legal so that law-texts can be approached by
their interpreter in a way which will enable a more edifying interpretive
yield than has been possible under the aegis of positivism. Arguably, what
has been deemed superfluous can indeed be shown to count even more than
what has been said to matter: the traces haunting the words of the statute or
of the judicial decision can be understood as telling us more about the law
than an exegesis of these words themselves can ever do, no matter how
much analyticity one brings to their reading. While the issue is, therefore,
that of the supplementation of the text in its graphical dimension, there is
no question of jettisoning that graphical dimension itself or, as far as the
law is concerned, of doing away with the positivistic aspect of law (a point
which connects to Derrida’s claim that, as much as metaphysics has
confined philosophical thought, one cannot do without its concepts, since
one simply has no language that would escape that history, which would be
foreign to it). To assert that after “comparative law” has been about the
posited only―statutes, judicial decisions, and other technical
paraphernalia―it should now be preoccupied only with traces, would
simply be reversing the hierarchy, replacing one exclusion with another,
and showing that comparativists are still in thrall to a simplistic binary

37. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 220: “One never escapes the economy of war” (“On
n’échappe jamais à l’économie de guerre”) (emphasis in original).
38. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 296 (“remplace . . . un manque”).
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division, which is always a form of closure. What is required instead of a
mere inversion is a displacement of the governing paradigm. This motion
pushes away from simplification towards complexification in the sense that
comparative legal studies is called upon to transgress dualism and provide a
resolution of the A-B antagonism through something that is neither A nor
B. In no way, therefore, ought comparative legal studies to forgo the usual
legal artifacts, such as statutes and judicial decisions. Indeed, the
traces―historical, political, social, economic, philosophical, and so
forth―are precisely to be found at work in statutes and judicial decisions,
which must therefore remain one of the principal focuses of study for
comparativists-at-law. Tracing thus appears as a radicalization of legal
positivism indebted to the very legal positivism which it radicalizes. But
the posited dimension of law cannot be that at which comparison stops, no
matter how much technical virtuosity is on display by committed
positivists. Rather, it must be something from which comparison begins its
presencing. The idea is to refuse to take statutes or judicial decisions (to
emphasize two of the most conventional law-texts) only as a posited or a
given, to reject any idea pointing to the static condition of positivistic
groundedness, and, through an unceasing movement of oscillation away
from and towards the posited, to try to see how statutes and judicial
decisions exist also as the traces that haunt them. In this way, one allows
that which has never been countenanced within the anterior regime to
invade the field (since a trace can be erased, repression was possible),
causes positivism to tremble, and dismantles the received order and its
violently monistic procedures so as to reveal law’s enculturation and
expose law qua law-as-culture (in this sense, as it seeks to interrupt and
remedy a narrative of interdiction, there is no question that the trace and
the tracing of the trace is a politics). While the legitimation of traces is
bound significantly to expand the range of information deemed pertinent as
regards the constitution of law-texts (although there is little doubt that from
the point of view of the system being questioned, this odd and extravagant
movement of opening is always going to be reduced to a form of
miscegenation), it remains the case that not even the enrolment of the traces
within the comparative enterprise will allow the comparativist-at-law
ultimately to secure access to the meaning of foreign law, to arraign its
foreignness. Less abysmal no doubt, his failure will nonetheless prove
ineliminable for to interpret can never be the same thing as to have access.
At the very least, though, the comparativist must have traced.
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About Differance
As the comparativist undertakes to invent the traces that constitute the
law-text in order to ascribe meaning to it, he must accept that he will never
be in a position to do so―not in the sense, at least, of ascertaining a
meaning of the text that would be fixed and definitive, immobile and
certain. For one thing, meaning is always postponed. Even as the
comparativist identifies a trace, he realizes that that trace is not fully
present since it can itself be traced to another trace (still regarding the
French statute on religious dress at school, for example, while the text of
the statute can be traced to the French political unwillingness to recognize
minority rights, that unwillingness―that trace―can be traced to the
political philosophy of Rousseau). But this process, being structural to the
text, is infinite (the political philosophy of Rousseau can itself be traced to
Sparta, which he adopted as model), which is to say that the text is
infinitely palimpsestic. Indeed, it becomes impossible to reach an
originarity.39 In Derrida’s words, “there is no atom.”40 Yet, even if, strictly
speaking, endless traceability marks the singularity of every law-text, the
comparativist will have to bring his tracing of this dissemination―his
“errancy”41―to an end, if only on account of the kind of existential
compromise that institutional circumstance requires (I have in mind a word
limit or a submission deadline, not to mention the financial constraints
confining scholarly mobility). This manifestation of how the will maintains
itself in the tracing implies that the comparativist will necessarily fall short
of the full meaning of the text or, to return to the idea of “presence,” that he
will never succeed in making the text fully present to itself, that he will not
ensure that the text is, so to speak, at peace with itself. “The” meaning of
the text, then, will always find itself deferred.
But there is one other reason why no meaning identified by the
comparativist can be regarded as “the” meaning of the text, and it is that
textual meaning will vary with each interpreter.42 Not only, then, is
meaning deferred but it is also the case that meaning differs according to
the specific interpreter of the text (the notion of “specificity” being, of

39. Id. at 233: “[I]t is impossible absolutely to justify a point of departure” (“il [est] impossible de
justifier absolument un point de départ”).
40. JACQUES DERRIDA, POINTS DE SUSPENSION 147 (Elisabeth Weber ed., Galilée 1992) (1983)
(“il n’y a pas d’atome”).
41. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 232 (“errance”).
42. For a famous statement along these lines, see STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? (1980). An instantiation of Fish’s striking recantation is at Stanley Fish, Intention is All There
Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109
(2008).
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course, most problematic in the sense at least in which it brings to bear
matters arising beyond individuality, such as processes of
institutionalization). Consider this analogy. The old Paris café within which
I am writing does not mean the same thing to my German friend as it does
to me and does not mean to an architect what it does to my German friend
and does not mean to a historian what it does to an architect and so forth.
To the extent that any of us can be said to “understand” the café, each of us
does so according to his own lights (again, institutional processes are
relevant to the matter in important ways: imagine two architects, one
having studied under Renzo Piano and the other with Frank Gehry). Once
more, what can be said of a café can be affirmed of a foreign law-text. If he
understands it at all, a comparativist understands a law-text differently from
other comparativists (institutional socialization proving significantly and
ascertainably pertinent to any act of understanding).43 Yet, none of the
meanings being generated by different comparativists can lay a legitimate
claim to being “the” meaning of the text. Both the structure of the text (it is
never fully present to itself) and the structure of interpretation (it is never
identical to itself) undercut any attempt to fixate meaning. To return to the
illustration of the café, how could we tell who is “right” about it: the
historian, the architect, my German friend, or me? The fact is that we all
bring to bear different perspectives, none of them being “the” true one.
Indeed, it seems that “truth” has very little to do with the interpretive
situation. At best, since truth is not a matter of the thing itself but a
question of words, truth is plural.44 Although Derrida himself took the view
that “[o]ne must have truth,”45 if there are but truths, any number of them,
one might arguably do well to renounce the word “truth” altogether; after
all, is there not more than a touch of the oxymoronic in “truths”? Be that as
it may, Derrida, in order to capture the infinite motion of a meaning that is
at once deferred (from the transitive French verb, “différer”) and different
(from the intransitive French verb, “différer”), coined the neologism
“differance” (in French, “différance”). Although it sounds exactly like
“difference” (in French, “différence”), the word is spelled idiosyncratically
and purports to attest to a process whereby the meaning of a text is
43. I have in mind a key sentence in the leading text of Gadamer on hermeneutics: “It is enough to
say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.” HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD 296 (2d rev. English ed., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall transl. 2004) (1986)
(“Es genügt zu sagen, daß man anders versteht, wenn man überhaupt versteht”) (emphasis in original).
Although Derrida was often critical of Gadamer’s assumptions and strategies, I cannot see that he
would have disapproved of the gist of this particular statement.
44. JACQUES DERRIDA, EPERONS 83 (Flammarion 1978) (“la vérité est plurielle”).
45. JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 79-80 n. 23 (Editions de Minuit 1972) (“[I]l faut la vérité”)
(emphasis in original).
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infinitely-deferred and ever-different, which is to say that, in Derrida’s
parlance, it is always to-come (it is not there as object, at least not in the
way in which a pen can be said to be on Casimir’s table at this moment).
Incidentally, this neologism proved very influential and was received in
leading French and English dictionaries.
There is one more point, which is of especial relevance to comparative
endeavors as they operate across languages. Derrida’s idea of “differance”
challenges the very possibility of translation or, at least, of a translation
which could be said to be accurate or correct. After all, if the translator
does not have access to “the” meaning of a text, how could he be said to be
translating it accurately or correctly? Indeed, Derrida asserts that “[w]hat
guides [him] is always untranslatability.”46 He observes that “Peter . . . is
not a translation of Pierre” and also remarks that “the words deux, two,
zwei . . . remain bound to a language.”47 And there is no way, no matter
how excellent the translation, in which singularity can be surmounted and
misunderstanding/maladjustment effaced. Indeed, because it is inherently
inadequate, translation does not erase difference: it exacerbates it. What
there is in the third space where meaning is negotiated, that is,
deconstructed and reconstructed, is neither, say, the “original” Shakespeare
in sixteenth-century English, at once authoritative and vulnerable, nor a
piece of twentieth-century French literature: it is a transacted hybrid, which
features inherent indeterminacy and irresolution, which is the result of
intercultural tension and which is the source of further intercultural tension.
In this regard, Derrida’s view is uncompromising:
[B]etween my world and every other world, there is initially the space
and time of an infinite difference, of an interruption incommensurable
with all the attempts at passage, of bridge, of isthmus, of
communication, of translation, of trope, and of transfer, which the
desire for world or world sickness . . . will attempt to pose, to impose,
to propose, to stabilize. There is no world, there are only islands.48

46. This passage is taken from the transcript of an interview with Derrida in the MAGAZINE
(Apr. 2004), at 26 (“Ce qui me guide, c’est toujours l’intraductibilité”).
47. JACQUES DERRIDA, PSYCHE 209 (2d ed., Galilée 1998) (1985) (“Peter . . . n’est pas une
traduction de Pierre”) (emphasis in original); 1 JACQUES DERRIDA, LA BETE ET LE SOUVERAIN 241
(Galilée 2008) (2002) (“les mots ‘deux’, ‘two’, ‘zwei’ . . . restent liés à une langue”) (emphasis in
original).
48. 2 JACQUES DERRIDA, LA BETE ET LE SOUVERAIN 31 (Galilée 2010) (2002) (“[E]ntre mon
monde et tout autre monde, il y a d’abord l’espace et le temps d’une différence infinie, d’une
interruption incommensurable à toutes les tentatives de passage, de pont, d’isthme, de communication,
de traduction, de trope et de transfert que le désir de monde ou le mal de monde . . . tentera de poser,
d’imposer, de proposer, de stabiliser. Il n’y a pas de monde, il n’y a que des îles”).
LITTERAIRE,
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For Derrida, then, “the cruel law of difference” entails that there can
be no anticipation of agreement in the face of disagreement, that there can
be only negotiation and its attendant power dynamics, rather than
dialogue.49 The fact is that one keeps meeting one’s failure to meet the
other. Yet, even in the face of communicatio interrupta―which is also
communio interrupta―despite this discontinuity between emitter and
receiver, against insurpassable semantic lability, Derrida refuses to
renounce the constitution of meaning. Even as he accepts that meaning is
always already exposed to the irresistible anarchy of play (the word does
not connote a game so much as the semantic movement left on account of
structural plasticity),50 that translinguistic identity of meaning is
impossible, he actively pleads for translation: “I must translate, transfer,
transport (übertragen) the untranslatable.”51 How to understand this aporia,
which, incidentally, brings to mind Robert Cover’s claim that “unification
of meaning . . . exists only for an instant, and [that] that instant is itself
imaginary”?52 In this regard, Simone Glanert offers a path-breaking
reflection on translation in the law as that which must be possible even as it
is impossible. Displaying thorough familiarity with Derrida’s thought,
making specific reference to comparative legal studies (it is noteworthy
that translation has been overlooked by most orthodox comparativists-atlaw, an omission which stands as another indictment of “the system
functioning as the effacing of difference”)53, she shows that
localization/circumscription of meaning does not leave comparation bereft.
But “the play of the world” is such that comparative legal studies has to
address the hurdle of embeddedness beyond the structure of language and
its attendant implications on meaning.54

49. See JACQUES DERRIDA, ALTERITES 85 (Osiris 1986). The quotation is from DERRIDA,
ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 291 (“la loi cruelle . . . de la différence”) (emphasis in original).
50. See DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 382: “[P]lay includes the work of meaning” (“le
jeu comprend le travail du sens”).
51. JACQUES DERRIDA, BELIERS 77 (Galilée 2003) (“Je dois traduire, transférer, transporter
(übertragen) l’intraduisible”) (emphasis in original).
52. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1983).
53. See Simone Glanert, Comparaison et traduction des droits: à l’impossible tous sont tenus, in
COMPARER LES DROITS, RESOLUMENT 279-311 (Pierre Legrand ed., Presses Universitaires de France
2009); SIMONE GLANERT, DE LA TRADUCTIBILITE DU DROIT (Dalloz 2011). The quotation is from
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 38 (“[le] système fonctionnant comme effacement de la
différence”).
54. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 337 (“le jeu du monde”).
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On the Double Bind
The interpretive process involves two key sets of constraints. These
strictures put the interpreter in a double bind (the expression, which
Derrida presses into service in a variety of settings, is indebted to Gregory
Bateson). At the outset, the interpreter―in our case, the comparativist-atlaw―is embedded in the culture into which he has been thrown. He is, in
crucial ways, unable to overcome that horizon. Consider the fact that I was
thrown into a French language and, therefore, into a binary vision of the
world. As a Francophone, I experience the world as either feminine or
masculine. And this apprehension extends to objects. For me, a chair is
feminine, while an armchair is masculine; a computer is masculine, while a
printer is feminine. Now, I am not at liberty to jettison this linguistic
identity. I may choose to learn other languages. I may indeed decide not to
speak or not to read French ever again. But I cannot make it such that my
francophony will never have been there, that it will never have constituted
me into the being that I am as I write today. The same goes with law. If in a
first-year class in a Paris law faculty I have been inducted into the view that
there exists, and that there must exist, a firm division between “private
law” and “public law” (or, more specifically, between “droit privé” and
“droit public”), and if I have spent a further four years of study acting on
the basis of this distinction, I cannot simply eradicate such experience
when at some later point I undertake to take an interest in English law.
And, whether I am conscious of this fact or not, my institutionalization into
French law will intrude into “my” interpretive picture of English law—how
could it not? One implication following upon these observations is that the
interpreter―here, the comparativist-at-law―must forgo objectivity.
Indeed, the comparativist must renounce the very idea of “understanding”
as we commonly approach it. A French lawyer cannot understand English
law and certainly cannot enter into a dialogue with an English lawyer.
There is only discord, and all that the French lawyer can hope to
understand is English law as filtered, for example, through the linguistic
and legal schemes of apprehension into which he himself has been thrown.
In other words, what he can access, and all that he can access, is “his”
image of English law (I hold the word in the tweezers of quotation marks in
order to recall the matter of institutionalization, which colors the
particularity of any interpretation). Since he cannot transpose himself into
someone who speaks from English law’s words, all he has is “his”
appreciation, which entails that, in the final analysis, the comparison goes
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in a circle starting with the self and ending with the self: “Everything given
to me under the light appears as given to myself by myself.”55
Thus, when the comparativist articulates an interface between
“Schuld” in the German law of divorce (or, rather, “Ehescheidung”) and
“fault” in the Californian law of divorce around, say, the notion of
“transgression,” the alleged “commonality” is necessarily the speculative
outcome of his own translations. The tale of “transgression”, then, is the
narrative receptacle of the tales of “Schuld” and “fault,” themselves the
receptacles of other tales recounted, for example, by German judges or
Californian law professors. Prompted by a desire to engage foreign law,
purporting (violently) to organize disparate information, constructing the
third space even as it seeks loyally to account for the laws of Germany and
California, the re-presentational vocabulary “produc[es] difference out of
incommensurability (rather than equivalence out of difference)”.56 Far from
erasing difference, the commensurative act redeploys it. And because
difference thus finds itself multiplied, the fashioning of this hybrid, very
much a refraction of the comparativist’s power, is shown to be traversed by
the political. Ultimately, apart from the comparativist-at-law, there is no
common denominator possibly authorizing the bridging of the gap between
more than one law in co-presence: the gap is the gap, which is not a
problem for comparativists-at-law who can recognize and respect the
differend. Again, comparison does not operate referentially, but
differentially: it does not refer to a “law-in-itself” to which, somehow, the
comparativist-at-law could gain access, but to a strategy of re-presentation.
(These remarks, incidentally, do not mean to denigrate the kind of insight
that remains possible from a critical distance and, indeed, which can only
be had from such vantage point: I can affirm, except that I do so on my
“own” behalf.)
To those who say that to articulate research in foreign law around the
idea of “fiction” demeans “comparative law,” which ought to extol
objectivity, I reply that objectivity is itself a fiction (if a notion whose
fictionality tends to be denied in unexamining fashion). Importantly, to say
that the comparativist-at-law cannot be objective is not to suggest that his
observations will be subjective. As I have explained, his linguistic and legal
identities, for example, will inevitably play a role in his apprehension of
foreign law―and these, in significant ways, do not have to do with

55. Id. at 136 (“Tout ce qui m’est donné dans la lumière paraît m’être donné à moi-même par
moi-même”).
56. Meaghan Morris, Foreword, in NAOKI SAKAI, TRANSLATION AND SUBJECTIVITY xiii (1997). I
also draw on JACQUES DERRIDA, KHORA 75 (Galilée 1993).
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“subjecthood.”57 In the event, though, the comparativist will inescapably
generate a meaning that is “other than” anything that would be “there.”
But not only is the comparativist operating under constraint, the law
that he has made into his object of study is encumbered also. Such, then, is
the other aspect of the double bind. Indeed, the English law of anticipatory
breach or the French law of promesse de vente also features a history, a
politics, a philosophy, and so forth. As I have mentioned, this array of
traces is structural and it is, ultimately, infinite―so much so, in fact, that
meaning is unsaturable, which implies that any account of the law-text is
fated to be subtractive (it will be less than what the law-text is in effect
saying) and that the law-text will always remain the repository of a secret,
foreover inaccessible in its withdrawal from presence (which, incidentally,
is the text’s opportunity to have a future as an object of interpretation). In
other words, the law-text being interpreted can never be ascribed all the
meaning that it solicits. For example, the French statute on religious dress
at school means infinitely more than any comparativist can ever say about
it, and there is not a method in the world that could allow him fully to trace
the extent of the statute’s embeddedness. In the apt counsel of Samuel
Beckett, “il y a toujours à écouter” (“there is always something more to
listen to”).58 Always, then, the singularity of foreign law can be enhanced,
that is, yet another trace can be identified, still more information can be
offered about the text. Addressing interpretation, George Steiner points to
the exorbitance of the sphere of relevance:
The informing [situation] of any single sentence in, say, Flaubert’s
Madame Bovary, is that of the immediate paragraph, of the
surrounding chapter, of the entire novel. It is also that of the state of
the French language at Flaubert’s time and place, of the history of
French society, and of the ideologies, politics, colloquial associations
and terrain of implicit and explicit reference, which press on, which
perhaps subvert or ironise, the words, the turns of phrase in that
particular sentence. The stone strikes the water and concentric circles
ripple outward to open-ended horizons.59

A legal “translation” of this claim might be that:

57. See DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 335: “The ‘subject’ of writing does not exist if one
means by that some sovereign solitude of the writer. The subject of writing is a system of relations
between layers: . . . mental, society, world. Within this scene, the punctual simplicity of the classical
subject is nowhere to be found” (“Le ‘sujet’ de l’écriture est un système de rapports entre les couches:
. . . du psychique, de la société, du monde. A l’intérieur de cette scène, la simplicité ponctuelle du sujet
classique est introuvable”) (emphasis in original).
58. CHARLES JULIET, RENCONTRES AVEC SAMUEL BECKETT 49 (Editions P.O.L. 1999) (1973).
59. GEORGE STEINER, ERRATA 19 (1997).
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It would be unwise . . . to regard anything in Japanese society as prima
facie irrelevant to the understanding of Japanese law on first setting out
to get to grips with it. The links between law and language, law and the
political or social and economic order, law and the history and
traditions of the country, its codes of morality, its senses of justice and
the relationship between the legal profession and other professions and
between legal scholarship and other forms of scholarship, the relative
standing of different actors in and around the legal system, all have
their impact on law and its administration and the definition of law and
legal scholarship.60

Ultimately, “[t]he world is utterly, thoroughly legal.”61
Unsurprisingly, then, the comparativist-at-law, or at least the comparativistat-law whose life experiences have heightened his sensitivity to difference,
is afflicted by the suspicion that his analysis is never singular enough (“Il y
a toujours quelque chose d’absent qui me tourmente,” to quote the
haunting words of Camille Claudel inscribed on an Ile Saint-Louis building
in Paris). Yet, there is no possibility of coincidence―in the sense of a total
or perfect overlap―between the law-text’s singularity and the
singularization of it being performed by the comparativist as he has the text
turning within itself to reveal its traces (just like a glove, which doubles
back on itself to show its other side), a process which Derrida often refers
to as “invagination,” a term he appears to have borrowed from
embryology.62 Think, for instance, of “the invagination of an inside
pocket.”63
Of Invagination as Justice
In the same way that no language is ever pure, no text ever consists of
purely one language. The idea that a law-text, such as a statute or a judicial
decision, could be exclusively about something that would be called “law”
cannot withstand scrutiny. There is inevitably more than one language at
work within a text. For Derrida, then, an (unconditional) law of
heteronomy must replace the Kantian unconditional law of the selfdetermination of the subject. In his words, “[i]t is a matter of heteronomy,

60. Geoffrey Wilson, English Legal Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 818, 831 (1987).
61. THOMAS BERNHARD, IST ES EINE KOMÖDIE? IST ES EINE TRAGÖDIE? (1967), in
ERZÄHLUNGEN 74 (Suhrkamp 2001) (“Die Welt ist eine ganz und gar, durch und durch juristische”).
62. GEOFFREY BENNINGTON, JACQUES DERRIDA 210 (Le Seuil 1991).
63. JACQUES DERRIDA, DU DROIT A LA PHILOSOPHIE 497 (Galilée 1990) (“L’invagination d’une
poche intérieure”). Another example is the Centre Georges-Pompidou in Paris: “[A]ll the mechanical
services, as well as structural elements, are exposed. It is like a human body with all its organs and
systems externalized, including the skeleton.” IVAN ŽAKNIĆ, Pompidou Center 23 (Flammarion
1983). For a “definition” of “invagination,” see DERRIDA, PARAGES, supra note 19, at 133.
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of a law come from the other—of the other in [the text], an other greater
and older than [the text].”64 There is “the non legal or pre-legal origin of
the legal.”65 Yes, yes. “The trace of the other ha[s] imprinted itself
indelibly within the innermost part of the own, no matter how it might be
disguised and covered by new programmes.”66 According to Derrida, the
fact that, through the trace-as-other, “the other participates originarily to
meaning” shows that, ultimately, justice is at stake.67 As every text realizes
the other within itself—as every law-text stands as primordial
heterogeneity, as the coalescence of historical, political, social, economic,
philosophical, and other traces showing difference to be always already at
work within the text—justice requires that difference necessarily be
recognized and respected, even as any encounter with the other must take
place in the mode of a non-encounter given that the relation to the other
adopts, in effect, the form of a “no-relation” on account of the other’s
ultimate inaccessibility (in the end, the self cannot reach the other: he will
not close the gap).68 Comparativists-at-law, who concern themselves with
otherness, are asked to accept that their hyper-responsibility vis-à-vis the
trace-as-other must “regulat[e] the justice and the justness of [their]
behaviour, of [their] theoretical, practical, and ethico-political decisions,”69
to acknowledge that this ineluctable commitment, this indebtedness arising
from a debt which cannot be cancelled (the other is there and remains
there), demands an appreciation allowing for the other law’s “irreplaceable
singularity.”70
∞
“Play,” of course, when “viewed from within rationalist discourse . . .
seems almost to gesture toward[s] a realm outside value altogether.”71
Arguably, though, it heralds the liberation of thought from its obsessive
strategies of containment and preoccupations with categories, concepts,
definitions, not to mention the shibboleths of objectivity and truth. As one

64. JACQUES DERRIDA, VOYOUS 123 (Galilée 2003) (“Il y va ici . . . d’une hétéronomie, de la loi
venue de l’autre . . . — de l’autre en moi plus grand et plus ancien que moi”).
65. JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITIQUES DE L’AMITIE 176 (Galilée 1994) (“l’origine non juridique ou
pré-juridique du juridique”).
66. PETER SLOTERDIJK, DERRIDA, EIN ÄGYPTER 27 (Suhrkamp 2007) (“Im Innersten des Eigenen
ha[t] sich die Spur des Anderen unauslöschlich eingeprägt, mochte sie noch so sehr unkenntlich
gemacht und von neuen Programmen überdeckt sein”).
67. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 107 (“L’autre collabore originairement au sens”).
68. DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE, supra note 24, at 109.
69. JACQUES DERRIDA, FORCE DE LOI 45 (Galilée 1994) (“règle la justice et la justesse de nos
comportements, de nos décisions théoriques, pratiques, éthico-politiques”).
70. JACQUES DERRIDA, DONNER LA MORT 77 (Galilée 1999) (“la singularité irremplaçable”).
71. ELIZABETH D. ERMARTH, SEQUEL TO HISTORY 143 (1992).
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twists oneself out of positivism, without ever marking a complete break
with it, one dissociates oneself from any idea that law can be grounded in
the unambiguously posited and exhaustively present. The trace, which is
the other of the ground (it is, properly speaking, an-archical), reveals that
any alleged grounding of law in the posited has nothing to do with anything
that would be intrinsic to law and has everything to do with the work of
individuals determined to make things look so. But there is the play, which
shows not so much the individual at play as the interpreter being played by
something which escapes his control. This point is but one implication of
the focus on the trace, which emphasizes the conditions that must govern
“meaning-making” as a disseminative and differential process. Most
importantly, perhaps, tracing, and the comparativist-at-law’s tracing in
particular, engages in the suspension of the (calamitous) suspension of
heterogeneity (it acts to interrupt the hiding/repression of otherness that
legal positivism has been sponsoring) on the understanding, of course, that
the coming of heterogeneity into the comparation announces but more
interpretation—more instantiation, more unpresentability, more
intermittence, more play—which no pretence at synthetic closure—
mediation, communication, sublation, totalization—can overcome.72
By way of non-conclusion (how could a mere introduction terminate
anything?), I want to indicate, briefly, what my ever-pragmatic U.S. friends
style the “take-home” with respect to this argument. To be sure, Derrida
makes this task particularly challenging, if only because his range of
intellectual interests was much too extensive for him to pursue only one
theme. Nonetheless, it is possible to ascertain what can be styled
“persistences” in his writing. Such a significant preoccupation, it seems to
me, has to do with the idea of “difficulty.” Derrida was always concerned
with difficulty, especially with the difficulty of understanding and,
specifically, with the difficulty of understanding what is manifestly
complex, such as a text. I take the view, then, that Derrida teaches us how
there is more to a text than meets the eye (or is it the “I”?). And he instructs
us also that there is more to interpretation than we have been assuming.
Since comparativists-at-law are primarily called upon to act as interpreters
of (foreign) texts, these two lessons should stand us in very good stead
indeed. Along the way, as he assigns an immense critical capacity to the
trace, Derrida shows that “negativity is a resource,”73 if only because,
given no objectivity and no truth, the comparativist-at-law must assume
72. Here also, I derive insight from Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, The Suspension of
Suspension: Settling for the Improbable, 15 LAW & LIT. 345 (2003).
73. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 381 (“la négativité est une ressource”) (emphasis in
original).
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substantial responsibility for his normative (and fallible) elections. To
accept that he is situated firmly within contingency is for the comparativist
to begin to take responsibility for his own perspectival appreciations. To
negative objectivity and truth is, in the end, the way to avoid intellectual
complacency, which is precisely what engulfs one when one stops thinking
of one’s re-presentation as a re-presentation and begins to see it as being
endowed with a transcendental quality that would make it objective or
which would permit it access to truth (that is, when one turns a provisional
private vocabulary into a permanent public one). As it allows for ethical
space―“[t]here is no ethics without the presence of the other”74―Derrida’s
strategy invites interpretive dispute, enhances agency, and forces the
comparativist-at-law to defend his views in the course of exchanges with
other comparativists. The negativity at issue is, therefore, anything but
sterile. Negativity is assertion (of an alternative): “The artist is active, but
negatively.”75 It is on account of negativity’s enabling valency that the
conversation continues.
It befits comparative legal studies that “theory,” on account of its
Greek roots, should refer not only to sight but to travel. In ancient Greece, a
“theoros” was, for instance, someone who went on a pilgrimage to a
religious festival, embarked on a journey to consult an oracle, or travelled
abroad for the sake of learning.76 As Jacques Derrida, himself an incessant
traveller, equips one with a theory of the trace and of the ghost, of
differance and of the double bind, of the dissolution of the transcendental,
he makes it possible for the comparativist-at-law to attend to urgent
instances of concrete comparation away from the (conservative) politics of
sameness and towards an otherness which, while occult and inexhaustible,
motivates, calls, and indeed summons him.
∞
In the spirit of a “joyful affirmation of the play of the world,”77 the
trace reveals the non-linearity and interstitiality haunting the text. It takes

74. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 202 (“Il n’y a pas d’éthique sans présence de
l’autre”) (emphasis in original). Derrida insists that he does not use “ethics” in the way in which the
notion has traditionally been deployed. See, e.g., DERRIDA, ALTERITES, supra note 49, at 71: “[R]espect
for the singularity or for the call of the other cannot simply belong to the domain of ethics, to the
domain conventionally and traditionally determined of ethics”) (“le respect de la singularité ou de
l’appel de l’autre ne peut pas appartenir simplement au domaine de l’éthique, au domaine
conventionnellement, traditionnellement déterminé, de l’éthique”).
75. SAMUEL BECKETT, PROUST (1931), in 4 THE GROVE CENTENARY EDITION 539 (Paul Auster
ed. 2006).
76. See generally ANDREA W. NIGHTINGALE, SPECTACLES OF TRUTH IN CLASSICAL GREEK
PHILOSOPHY 40-71 (2004).
77. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 427 (“l’affirmation joyeuse du jeu du monde”).
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the text beyond stasis, that is, beyond the analytical limits reductively
allowed by the hard copy, thereby recasting the text as a hypertext whose
constitution is shown to be the product of an intricate, decentered, structure
of interactive and interconnected discourses linked through multiple
pathways in an open-ended textuality where the interpreter, as he pursues
this or that string of references, as he elects his reading route, becomes, in
significant ways, the inventor of meaning. The appendix to this essay
conveys a sense of what comparison à la trace may resemble as the
comparativist-at-law weaves the threads that are constitutive of the text into
an argument about reterritorialization featuring inherently indeterminate
and interminable meaning, as he creatively/critically inscribes the survival
of foreign law not as a posited, but as a text under way. As such, it shows
the patrons, merchants, and middlemen of “comparative law” how the
presencing of the trace, by “giv[ing] signified meaning no respite, no
rest,”78 wants to mark the emergence into relevance, into licit comparative
writing, of what could be termed a re-presentation of singularity through
the trace traceable to another trace itself traceable to another trace . . .

78. Id. at 42 (“ne laissant aucun répit, aucun repos au sens signifié”).
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APPENDIX
Tracing the French Statute on Religious Dress at School
“Statute No. 2004-228 Dated 15 March 2004 Regulating, in
Application of the Principle of Secularism,79 the Wearing of Signs or
Clothes Expressing a Religious Affiliation in Public Primary Schools,
Junior and Senior High Schools”
[“Loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du
principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une
appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics”]
Article 1
“In public primary schools, junior and senior high schools, the
wearing of signs or clothes whereby students conspicuously express a
religious affiliation is prohibited.”
[“Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes
ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une
appartenance religieuse est interdit.”]
∞
By way of supplement to the usual reading of law as only that which
is posited, the comparativist-at-law, having made the French statute into his
object of study, abiding by a sophisticated appreciation of textuality,
purports to invent articulable traces constitutively haunting the law-text
through infinitely complex networks of enmeshment—and therefore
structurally partaking of it as law-text. Illustrative statements of such
comparativism other-wise, deliberately set in the epigrammatic mode,
follow. (In a context where other editorial strictures obtained, each entry
would be developed at length.) As he performs this deployment with
deconstructive scrupulosity, being aware that no text allows for the
production of meaning at will, the comparativist-at-law, whose engagement
79. French has “laïcité,” which carries a local cultural colour that “secularism” fails to convey.
Indeed, the French language also has words like “séculier” and “sécularité.” These, however, are not
used in France in matters concerning churches and state. In other terms, there exists a specifically
French version of secularism bearing a specific appellation.
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is always contingent and whose account/ascription of significance remains
unsaturable (and therefore irreconcilable with the idea of a totalized or
holistic system of meaning), hearkens to law-as-culture and thereby
militates for the recomposition of the coordinates of comparison away from
mere positivism, whose yield can only ever be confined to an identification
of foreign law and not to the requisite understanding of it. Observe that to
the extent that they would want to resist tracing, casting it as counterlaw
rather than accepting it as the hyperlaw that it is, perhaps denigrating it as
some form of contemplative aestheticism mired in unauthorized
lucubrations, orthodox comparativists-at-law would be objecting to what
has always already happened.
The tracing at hand, then, is informed by theoretical commitments
which, before I turn myself into a sort of Borgesian “hacedor,” I am keen
to supplement by way of a brief exercise in heteroglossia. For these
purposes, I have appropriated fragments from five different texts, which I
now want, no doubt artificially, to exhibit adjacently.
“Come on! Play! Invent the world! Invent reality!”80
“For the point at issue is merely the meaning of the texts, not their truth.”81
“What can one do but speculate, speculate, until one hits on the happy
speculation?”82
“No one, however special his point of vantage, can get . . . into the shrine
of the single sense. . . . The pleasures of interpretation are henceforth linked
to loss and disappointment.”83
“A thousand possibilities will always remain open even as one understands
something of that sentence that makes sense.”84

80. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOOK AT THE HARLEQUINS!, in NOVELS, 1969-1974 571 (Brian Boyd
ed. 1996) (1974).
81. BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE 88 (2d ed., Samuel Shirley transl.
2001) (1670) (“De solo enim sensu-orationum, non autem de earum veritate laboramus”).
82. SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE (1958), in 2 THE GROVE CENTENARY EDITION 363 (Paul
Auster ed. 2006) (“Que voulez-vous, il faut spéculer, spéculer, jusqu'à ce qu'on tombe sur la
spéculation qui est la bonne”). The English text, a re-writing from the French, is Beckett’s.
83. FRANK KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY 123 (1979).
84. DERRIDA, LIMITED, supra note 13, at 122 (“Mille possibilités resteront toujours ouvertes, alors
même qu’on comprend quelque chose de cette phrase qui fait sens”).
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∞
- A series of recent judicial, legislative, and political interventions.
o Decision of the Conseil d’Etat dated 27 November 1989
o Circular of the Minister of National Education dated 12
December 1989
o Report of the Stasi Commission dated 11 December 2003
- A history of anti-clericalism manifesting itself as early as 1302.
o Edict of Nantes (1598)
o XVIIIth-century Enlightenment (Voltaire et al.)
o Revolution (1789)
o XIXth-century ultramontanism
o “Dreyfus Affair” (1894-1899)
o Statute on separation between churches and state (1905)
o Constitution of 4 October 1958
- A Rousseauian conception of “freedom” whereby freedom is
achieved through the state rather than against it.
- A cultural idea of “citizenship” whereby “citizenship” is created by
the state and is premised on the ideas of “universalism” and
“equality”, thus excluding the notion of “groups” or “collective
rights” and entailing cultural assimilation to “Frenchness” for all.
- A “Gallican” glorification of the state manifesting itself by way of a
centralized state authority and strong state involvement in the
fashioning of Frenchness.
- A highly-respected school sector entrusted with the highly-valued
mandate of instituting French Republican values and designed as a
“neutral” space beyond the reach of counter-powers (such as the
church, groups, or the family).
- An intellectual and spatial organization of French society featuring
the categorical distinction between the “public” and the “private”
realms.
- A growing presence of Islam in France.
o Demographic significance of the Muslim community in
France
 French colonial policy
 French post-colonial policy
o Perceived irreconcilability between French Republicanism
and Islam
o Fear of Islam/Islamophobia
 Heightened visibility of the Muslim community in
France
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 Revival of Islamic militancy in Algeria
 “9/11” (and subsequent terrorist attack in Madrid on
11 March 2004)
A distrust of localism and differentialism correlating with a
longstanding commitment to a unitary and egalitarian citizenry.
A strongly hierarchical society and work environment correlating
with ascertainable risk-aversion on the part of individuals (and,
specifically, individual public servants).
An openly-expressed desire for sustained state activism.
A predilection for the enactment of apodictic statutes purporting to
ensure fixity of meaning as an optimal instrument of social
engineering.
A predilection for abstraction over casuistry correlating with an
institutional prioritization of “law” over “fact”.
An objectification of women correlating with a longstanding
conception of manliness translating into a specific approach to the
conduct of gendered relationships.
o “Courtly love” (or amour courtois)85
o Specificity of feminisms, more philosophical/literary than
political/pragmatic
A keen confidence in the French “civilizing mission” (or “mission
civilisatrice”).
A largely hermetic attitude vis-à-vis outside cultural influences.
...
o...
o...
...
...
o...
. . .
...
o. . .

85. For an illustration of the kind of creative and erudite scholarship which, in my view,
comparativists-at-law ought to have in mind as they proceed to substantiate their research, see PETER
GOODRICH, THE LAWS OF LOVE (2006). In its author’s words, this text is concerned with “lex
amatoria.”

